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APPLICABILITY OF ADA
NON-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES TO SELF-
INSURED HEALTH PLANS: DO "AIDS CAPS"
VIOLATE THE LAW?
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 1
to establish a comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
disability.2 Finding a compelling need and a "clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against persons
with disabilities,"3 Congress enacted the ADA to establish "clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards."4 The statutory scheme provides for
the federal government to play a "central role" in the enforcement of
those standards.5,
The ADA protects a "qualified individual with a disability"6 from dis-
crimination in such areas as "employment, housing, public accommoda-
tions, education, transportation, communication, recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public serv-
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, PUB. L. No. 101-336, 104 STAT. 327 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1992)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). The ADA is divided into five titles which proscribe discrimi-
nation in employment (I), public service (II), public accommodations and services (III),
telecommunications services (IV), and miscellaneous provisions (V). Id. §§ 12101-12213.
For employers with 25 or more employees, Title I of the ADA took effect on July 26, 1992.
It took effect on July 26, 1994 for employers with 15-24 employees. See id. § 12111(5).
3. Id. § 12101(a). An estimated 43 million Americans have physical or mental disa-
bilities. Id.
4. Id. § 12101(b).
5. Id. It has been noted that "[a]lthough all of the 50 states have existing laws that
prohibit various types of disability discrimination, those laws have been viewed as being
inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination faced by people. with disa-
bilities." OGLETREE ET AL., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS &
EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS, at 1-40, 1-41 (1992). Further, the disability laws enacted prior to
the ADA have been viewed as "highly varied, often uncertain, and inadequately enforced."
Id. at 1-41 (quoting Edf, Potluck Protection for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need to
Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
814, 844 (1977)).
6. Title I of the ADA defines qualified individual with a disability as "an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essen-
tial functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires... consider-
ation shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential."
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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ices."7 With respect to employment discrimination, the ADA prohibits
discrimination in compensation "and other terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment."8 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) has interpreted "terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment" to encompass "[flringe benefits available by virtue of em-
ployment, whether or not administered by a covered entity." 9 The
EEOC interpretation of the ADA includes employee health benefits.10
Employer sponsored health benefit plans and health insurance have re-
ceived considerable attention largely because the EEOC interpretation of
the ADA is not self-evident from the statutory language." Whether the
broad anti-discrimination mandates of the ADA will be applied to em-
ployer sponsored health plans has led to recent debate' 2 and litigation.' 3
7. Id. § 12101(a)(3).
8. Id. § 12112(a).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(f) (1993). See infra part II of this text discussing "covered enti-
ties." Additionally, ADA section 102(b)(1), which prohibits "limiting, segregating, or clas-
sifying a job applicant or employee in any way that adversely affects the opportunities or
status of such an applicant or employee" could be deemed applicable to employer pro-
vided health plans. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). Not only are job applicants and employees
potentially protected against the discriminatory practices of segregation or classification
that affect employee benefit participation, the ADA also prohibits "excluding or otherwise
denying equal benefits to a qualified non-disabled person because that person has a rela-
tionship or association with an individual with a disability." Id. § 12112(b)(4). For exam-
ple, this could be read to prohibit an employer from discriminating against an employee or
applicant who is the parent of a disabled child.
10. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, INTERIM ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS wrrH DISABILITIEs AcT TO DISA-
BILITY BASED DISTINCTION IN EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE (June 8, 1993)
[hereinafter INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE].
11. See infra Part III of this text analyzing the appropriate statutory language of the
ADA and EEOC regulations promulgated thereunder.
12. See Alison Grant, Knocking Down Barriers One by One: Disabled See Result of
Access Law, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 18, 1993, at 1 (discussing the suit brought
by the EEOC against a New York company for allegedly violating the ADA by excluding
insurance coverage for the treatment of AIDS); Frank Swoboda, Disabilities Law Could
Have A Big Impact on Health Care Benefits, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1993, at H2 (considering
whether the ADA will change the face of health care coverage and whether employers can
discriminate against cancer, heart disease, and AIDS patients in providing health care cov-
erage); AIDS Sufferers Suing Under Disabilities Act: Discrimination Claimed in Insurance
Cutoffs, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 1, 1993, at 3A (explaining that dozens of cases
involving insurance plans have been filed by the EEOC against employers that have elimi-
nated coverage for AIDS patients); Milt Freudenheim, Health Insurance Ruling To Hit
Small Employers, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1993, at D2 (asserting that the government crack-
down on employers who limit or deny health insurance for employees with AIDS will
mainly affect small businesses).
13. See Carparts Distr. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, 826 F.
Supp. 583 (D.N.H. 1993), vacated and remanded, No. 93-1954, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
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Compounding and perhaps furthering this debate is the skyrocketing
cost of health care.14 In response to rising health care costs, public offi-
cials, private employers, and labor unions have shifted more of the costs
of health care to employees.15 Thus, employers often decrease benefit
levels, raise deductibles, require participants to pay more of the premi-
ums, or employers do not provide health insurance at all. 6
To contain costs, some self-insured health plans have eliminated or
capped spending for certain high-cost illnesses or medical procedures.' 7
The high-cost illnesses that seem to be singled out most often are Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus (HIV). 8 Whether the ADA permits either excluding
coverage completely or capping coverage for a specific illness such as
HIV or AIDS, 9 which are covered disabilities under the ADA,20 ulti-
28319 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 1994); Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey,
No. 93 Civ. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 1993). In Mason Tenders the court denied the Mason
Tenders' motion for summary judgment. Mason Tenders v. Donaghey, No. 93 Civ. 1154,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1993). See also Estate of Kadinger v.
IBEW Local 110, No. Civ. 3-93-159, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18982 (D. Minn. Dec. 21,
1993). In this case the parties entered into a consent decree whereby defendant, IBEW,
paid $100,000 to the estate of Mark Kadinger and agreed to eliminate the "AIDS cap"
from the terms of the health plan. Id.
14. The United States spends more on health care than any other country. U.S. Gov-
ERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING: TRENDS, CONTRIBUTING
FACTORS, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 3 (1991). In 1990, the United States spent $676
billion on health care, an average of $2,660 per person. Id. In contrast, Canada spent
$2,000 per person. Id. Health care spending has "more than doubled as a share of total
labor compensation," increasing from 3.1% of total compensation in 1970 to 7.0%, in 1989.
Id. at 5 n.3. Research has found that for large employers health care spending rose 21.6%
between 1989 and 1990. Id. at 5. The cost of American health care rose from 9.1% of
GNP in 1980 to 12.2% in 1990. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH CARE:
PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL LESSONS FOR REFORM, Introduction (1992).
15. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH CARE: PROBLEMS AND POTEN-
TIAL LESSONS FOR REFORM, Introduction (1992).
16. Id. Despite the great amount of money spent on health care in the United States,
"nearly 34 million people, more than half of them working adults or their dependents,"
have no health insurance. Id. at 2. In addition, many more are under-insured or fear they
may lose their health insurance. Id.
17. See supra notes 12 and 13.
18. Id. The EEOC recently issued regulations in response to the many health insur-
ance plans that were eliminating or capping benefits for AIDS related illnesses. See gener-
ally INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10.
19. In November, 1991, the Centers for Disease Control redefined the definition of
AIDS to include "all HIV-positive persons with CD4+ lymphocyte counts below 200 cells
per cubic millimeter (/mm3) of blood, regardless of whether they have an AIDS defining
condition." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE CDC's CASE DEFINITION OF
AIDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED REVISIONS-BACKGROUND PAPER, at 1, 2 (1990).
In addition to this complex case definition, "AIDS defining" conditions are specified. Id.
1994]
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mately will be determined by the courts' interpretation of ADA section
501(c). 21
Because one of the objectives of the ADA is to eliminate discrimina-
tion against persons with disabilities in employment benefits and health
services, 22 the elimination or capping of benefits related to HIV or AIDS
is viewed by some as contrary to the purpose of the statute.23 Uncer-
tainty arises, however, for two reasons: first, the broad preemptive provi-
sions contained in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA);24 and second, ambiguities in the language of the ADA, particu-
larly section 501(c)(3). Ultimately, the narrow legal issue is whether the
ADA's nondiscrimination provisions' will apply to self-insured health
funds.2'
In response to the uncertainty regarding the ADA's applicability to
employee health insurance benefit plans, the EEOC, pursuant to its au-
thority under the ADA, issued Interim Enforcement Guidance regula-
tions explaining when and how the ADA applies to "employer provided
health insurance. ' '26 Despite these guidance regulations, considerable un-
certainty persists. Some self-insured employee health plans maintain that
at 1. These definitions may provide a basis for legally defining a person with HIV or
AIDS.
20. The Senate and House Labor Committees and the EEOC recognized infection
with HIV as a disability under the ADA. OGLETREE ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-67. The
House Judiciary Report notes that "[pl]ersons infected with the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus are considered, to have an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity."
H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 28 n.18 (1990). See also H.R. REP. No.
485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1990) (including HIV infection among the list of ADA
covered conditions, diseases and infections).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). The text of 501(c) is mirrored in the EEOC regulations. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.16(f). See also infra part III of this text discussing section 501(c).
22. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
23. INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at 6-11.
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974).
25. The United States Supreme Court has determined that ERISA's preemption pro-
vision, ERISA § 414(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), is to be interpreted broadly. See Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). This broad preemption precludes
states from regulating the contents of self-insured health benefit plans. Id.
26. See INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at 1. The regulations were
effective upon issuance and are stated to remain in effect "until rescinded or superseded."
Id. The regulations provide in part:
The interplay between the nondiscrimination principles of the ADA and em-
ployer provided health insurance, which is predicated on the ability to make
health-related distinctions, is both unique and complex. This interplay is, un-
doubtedly, most complex when a health insurance plan contains distinctions that
are based on disability. The purpose of this interim guidance is to assist Commis-
sion investigators in analyzing ADA charges which allege that disability-based
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the ADA does not cover self-insured health plans and, in particular, that
the nondiscrimination provisions and risk classification principles es-
poused by the EEOC in its guidance regulations do not apply at all to
self-insured health plans.
This Comment examines the scope of the ADA and accompanying
EEOC regulations and considers whether self-insured health funds may
either completely exclude coverage or impose benefit caps for medical
expenses incurred in the treatment of AIDS or HIV infection. Part I
discusses background issues, including the law prior to the ADA and the
unique regulation problems created by self-insured funds. Part II exam-
ines the coverage of the ADA. Specific consideration is given to deter-
mining whether a self-insured health fund should properly be considered
a "covered entity" under the statute. Further consideration is given to
AIDS as a covered disability under the ADA. Part III analyzes ADA
section 501(c) and considers the complex relationship between the ADA,
self-insured benefit plans, insurance industry practices, and the EEOC
Interim Enforcement Guidance regulations. Part IV, the conclusion, dis-
cusses the likely course of the debate.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Distinguishing Between "Insured" and "Self-Insured" Health
Benefit Plans
Over half of all Americans that receive their health care coverage from
their employers are covered by self-insured health benefit plans.27 Gen-
erally, an employer sponsored health insurance plan may obtain coverage
for its participants in one of two ways. First, an insurance contract may
be purchased directly from an insurance company, often referred to as an
"insured plan."'  The EEOC Interim Enforcement Guidance regulations
define an insured health plan as a "plan or policy that is purchased from
an insurance company or other organization, such as a [Health Mainte-
nance Organization]." 29 In the second method, self-insuring, an em-
ployer does not purchase an insurance contract from an insurance
company. Rather, an employer or group of employers establishes and
distinctions in the terms or provisions of an employer provided health insurance
plan violates the ADA.
Id.
27. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, AccESS TO HEALTH CARE; STATES RESPOND TO
A GROWING CRISIS 2 (1992).
28. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 732.
29. INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at 4 n.3.
19941
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contributes to a qualified trust.3" When self-insuring, the "employer di-
rectly assumes the liability of an insurer."'" The qualified trust, in turn,
pays benefits directly to participants according to the terms of the plan
document.32 Thus, the major distinction between an insured and self-in-
sured plan is that the latter does not purchase insurance contracts.
B. ERISA's Preemptive Scope and Self-Insured Health Funds
The distinction between insured plans and self-insured plans developed
primarily through the interpretation of ERISA's broad preemption provi-
sion.33 The preemption provision provides that ERISA "shall supersede
any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan."34 Although ERISA broadly preempts state laws
relating to employee benefit plans, 35 this preemption is qualified by the
"insurance savings clause." 36 The "savings clause" exempts from federal
preemption state laws that regulate insurance37 because Congress in-
tended "to reserve to the States the regulation of the 'business of insur-
ance"' which traditionally has been the subject of state regulation.38
Significantly, section 514(b)(2)(B) of ERISA,39 the "deemer clause," pro-
vides that a self-insured trust shall not "be deemed to be an insurance
30. Employers and employer groups establish a tax qualified trust to which the contri-
butions are made and from which benefits are paid. The qualified trust is a requirement
for tax favored status. See IRC § 401 (1988).
31. INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at 4 n.3.
32. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. A self-insured plan may employ a third
party administrator to administer the plan. However, such a role is purely ministerial, and
thus the plan sponsor is still the responsible fiduciary. See generally Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates, 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
728-32 (1985) (explaining that ERISA "contain[s] a broad preemption provision declaring
that the statute shall supersede any and all State laws ... [that] relate to any employee
benefit plan").
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
35. Id. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (stating that ERISA's pre-
emption provision is "conspicuous for its breadth").
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
37. Id. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 733 (explaining that ERISA's broad preemp-
tion is "substantially qualified" by the insurance savings clause); FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 58
(providing that "[t]he savings clause returns to the States the power to enforce those state
laws that 'regulate insurance').
38. FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 58.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
[T]he deemer clause exempt[s] self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that
"regulat[e] insurance" .... By forbidding States to deem employee benefits plans
"to be an insurance company or other insurer" ... the deemer clause relieves
[self-insured] plans from state laws "purporting to regulate insurance." As a re-
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company.., or to be engaged in the business of insurance ... for [the]
purposes of any law of any State."'  The legal effect of this interaction
between the "savings clause" and the "deemer clause" is that states can
regulate indirectly the content of insured plans, because states can regu-
late the terms of an insurance contract that is purchased by an insured
plan.4' However, states cannot regulate directly, or indirectly, the con-
tent of self-insured benefit plans.42 Self-insured plans do not purchase
insurance contracts and are not covered by ERISA's "savings clause,"
because they are "deemed" not to be an insurance company or insurer.
4 3
These ERISA provisions are significant because state legislatures have
responded to the present health care crisis by passing laws that regulate
the substantive content of health insurance policies.44 For example, a
state may require that any health insurance contract sold in the state must
contain coverage for outpatient kidney dialysis 45 or for certain birth de-
fects.' Moreover, states can mandate that all insurance contracts sold
within the state must provide a minimum level of mental health insur-
ance.47 But because a self-insured fund does not purchase a contract and
is not deemed an insurance company, the self-insured fund would not be
required to provide insurance for mental illness.48
States have taken the lead in developing strategies to expand access to
sult, self-funded ERISA plans are exempt from state regulations insofar as that
regulation "relate[s] to" the plan.
FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
41. "[Sltatutes regulating the substantive terms of insurance contracts have become
common place in all 50 States over the last 30 years." Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 728
(citations omitted).
42. See infra notes 48, 50 and accompanying text.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)
44. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 728 (1985) (citations
omitted). "The substantive terms of group-health insurance contracts.., have been exten-
sively regulated by the States. For example, the majority of States currently require that
coverage for dependents continue beyond any contractually imposed age limitation where
the dependent is incapable of self-sustaining employment because of mental or physical
handicap." Id.
45. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.25 (Anderson 1989).
46. E.g., 1963 MD. LAws 553 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 477X (1994)).
47. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 735 (analyzing whether a Massachusetts statute
that requires insurance contracts sold in the state to contain minimum levels of mental
health insurance coverage should be extended to plans that self insure).
48. Id. at 735 n.14. The Court recognized that its decision creates a "distinction be-
tween insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation while
the latter are not." Id. at 747.
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health care, control costs, and provide adequate insurance. 49 However,
the restrictions imposed by ERISA's preemption provision have ham-
pered state efforts to reform health care systems because the self-insured
funds can operate outside the state scheme."
Recognizing the problem of benefit exclusion, some state legislatures
have enacted legislation prohibiting discriminatory exclusion of insurance
coverage which is merely based on cost.51 For example, many states have
passed laws that prohibit disparate treatment of HIV or AIDS when an
exclusion or cap is not based on specific risk classification principles. 2
Also, virtually all states have enacted laws requiring that insurance cover-
age and premiums comport with acceptable risk classification princi-
ples.53 Again, owing to ERISA's preemptive scope, self-insured health
funds have been immune from these state-mandated risk classification
limitations.
Because of the immunity from state regulation, self-insured plans have
been able to discriminate against particular disabilities and discontinue
49. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: STATES
RESPOND To GROWING CRISIS (1992) (explaining that "[s]tates have taken a leadership
role in devising strategies to expand access to health insurance and contain the growth of
health costs"). Id. at 2. For example, Massachusetts and Oregon have initiated "play or
pay" systems whereby employers are required to pay a tax to help finance state insurance.
Id. at 3. Minnesota and Vermont have extended coverage to children through insurance
and Medicaid expansion. Id. at 50-51.
50. Id. The report identifies ERISA as one of the most significant barriers that states
face when considering health care reform because ERISA preempts state authority to reg-
ulate certain self-insured employer health plans. Id. It reports that "[s]tates can regulate
health insurance companies and their policies but not employee plans, including health
benefits provided by employers who self-insure." Id.
51. See infra note 53 and accompanying text; see supra note 49.
52. See, e.g., Omnibus AIDS Act, Ch. 88-380, 1988 Fla. Laws ch. 1996 (codified in
scattered sections of FLA. STAT.)
53. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 20, at 136 (stating "[v]irtually all States prohibit
unfair discrimination among persons of the same class and equal expectation of life. The
ADA adopts this prohibition of discrimination"). Additionally, most states have adopted
the National Association of Insurance Commissioner's Model of Unfair Trade Practices
Act. This model Act provides that "availability and pricing of insurance premiums must be
the same for all individuals regardless of a physical or mental impairment, except where
the refusal, limitation or rare differential is based on sound actuarial principles or is related
to actual or reasonably anticipated experience." DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR TASK FORCE
REPORT ON THE EFFECr OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT ON EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED HEALTH PLANS 52-53 (1993)[hereinafter BAR TASK FORCE 'REPORT] (citing
NAIC, MODEL REGULATION ON UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION IN LIFE AND HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE ON THE BASIS OF PHYSICAL OR MENTAL IMPAIRMENT section 3 (1990)).
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coverage for certain illnesses.14 Self-insured funds must, however, com-
ply with state laws not related to the business of insurance and must com-
ply with federal anti-discrimination laws.55
C. Self-Insured Health Plans and Modification of Benefits in Response
to AIDS Claims: Pre-ADA Analysis
Because states may not regulate self-insured health plans, and because
no federal law, including ERISA, directly regulates the substantive con-
tent of self-insured health benefit plans,56 challenges to a self-insured
health plan's modification of benefit terms relied either on the plan docu-
ment or the collective bargaining agreement. 7 Generally, employers and
plan trustees have broad discretion in determining the terms, coverage,
and benefit levels of health benefit plans.58 Accordingly, the employer or
trustees could change the content of the plan's terms.59
Considerable attention was drawn to the issue of benefit modification
following the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in McGann v. H & H
Music Co.6' In McGann, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that an employer had the right to modify its health ben-
efit plan by changing from an insured plan that provided one million dol-
54. See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
482 (1992). See also supra note 12.
55. The plain language of ERISA provides that preemption applies to "any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate .to any employee benefit plan." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a). Section 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4), provides that preemption "shall
not apply to any generally applicable criminal laws of a State." Further, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(4) provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter ... shall be construed to alter,
amend, modify, invalidate or impair or supersede" any federal law, rule or regulation is-
sued under federal law.
56. "ERISA ... contains almost no federal regulation of the terms of benefits plans."
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).. The one ma-
jor exception to ERISA's nonregulation of the content of health benefit plans is the provi-
sion requiring plans to continue providing health coverage paid for by the employee at the
group rate after certain events that terminate employment. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168.
57. See Allied & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157,
165 (1971) (holding that "under the National Labor Relations Act... mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining include ... insurance benefits.... and an employers unilateral mid-
term modification constitutes an unfair labor practice" and breach of the contract); Hansen
v. White Motor Corp., 788 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that "parties may them-
selves set out by agreement or private design, as set out in plan documents" the particular
terms of the employee health benefits plan).
58. See infra notes 66, 68, 70 and accompanying text.
59. See Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 546 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the effect of its decision and the holding in McGann may cause plan sponsors to "reduce or
'terminate non-vested health benefits simply by changing the terms of the plan").
60. 946 F.2d 401 (5th.Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
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lars in lifetime medical benefits to a self-insured plan which capped
lifetime coverage for AIDS related claims at five thousand dollars.6' The
health plan continued to provide one million dollars of coverage for all
illnesses except AIDS.62 McGann, the only plan participant with AIDS,
claimed that the employer discriminated against him in violation of ER-
ISA.63 Although ERISA does not prescribe any substantive terms or
specific benefit level of a health plan, ERISA section 510' prohibits dis-
crimination against a participant or beneficiary for exercising his rights
under the provisions of an employee benefit plan.65 McGann asserted
that the new plan provisions limiting AIDS related coverage constituted
an unlawful retaliation by the employer, arguing that the employer's pur-
pose was to interfere with McGann's attainment of rights to which he
might become entitled.66
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the lower
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.67 The Fifth
Circuit ruled that the plan document gave the employer an absolute right
to alter the terms of the plan,68 and found that plaintiff had not met his
burden of proving the existence of specific discriminatory intent.69 The
Fifth Circuit, noting that employers are free to "create, modify, and ter-
minate the terms and conditions of [an] employee benefit [welfare] plan
61. Id. at 408.
62. Id. at 403.
63. Id. at 403-04.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1140. This section provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or
discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which
he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan ... or for the
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which a participant may
become entitled under the plan.
Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 482 (1992). See Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 546-47 (11th Cir.
1993) (endorsing the holding in McGann that ERISA does not prohibit an employer from
changing the terms of a health benefit plan as long as the employer does not discharge an
employee to avoid paying benefits).
67. McGann, 946 F.2d at 403, 408.
68. See id. at 405 (stating that in contrast to pension benefits "there is an express statu-
tory exclusion of welfare plans from stringent minimum vesting ... standards ... [and]
ERISA does not require such vesting of the right to a continued level of the same medical
benefits once those are ever included in a welfare plan").
69. Id. at 404-05.
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without government interference,"7 held that the participant failed to
establish that the benefit changes unlawfully discriminated against him
because the changes were to, apply "equally to all participants who be-
came afflicted with AIDS."7 1 Significantly, the court stated that any ill-
ness or disease could be singled out for exclusion by an employer even
though the employer's decision may stem from some prejudice.72
The dispute in McGann arose prior to the enactment of the ADA.73
As a result, the appellate court's decision was limited to the issue of
whether the employer violated ERISA which, as noted, generally pro-
vides employers broad discretion in modifying the terms of a welfare ben-
efit plan.74 Thus, because the case was brought prior to the ADA, the
question of whether the same conclusion would have been reached if the
participant had brought the claim under the ADA was left open.
The answer to this question recently began to unfold. The EEOC has
filed determination letters75 and currently is involved in several lawsuits
charging that benefit modifications that single out HIV or AIDS (i.e.,
modifications akin to those found in McGann) are discriminatory and vi-
olate the ADA.76 In order to determine whether benefit modifications
that single out a particular disability violate the ADA, the scope and ap-
plicability of the ADA must be examined.
70. Id. at 408. Further, "ERISA does not broadly prevent an employer from 'discrimi-
nating' in the creation, alteration, or termination of employee benefits plans." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The court states that section 510 of ERISA does not mandate that if some or
even all catastrophic illnesses are covered, that any particular catastrophic illness, including
AIDS, must be among them. Id. It states that the provision "does not prohibit an em-
ployer from electing not to cover or continue to cover AIDS.... [or] any other disease and
its victims." Id.
73. The original law suit was brought in the district court in 1989. Because the ADA
was not effective until July 26, 1992, the court did not entertain an ADA analysis.
74. See supra notes 66, 68,70, and accompanying text. See also Shaw v. Delta Airlines,
463 U.S. 85 (1983).
75. See Spencer H. Lewis, District Director, EEOC, Determination, Donaghey v. Ma-
son Tenders Dist. Council Trust Fund, No. 160-93-0419 (Jan. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Determi-
nation Letter].
76. Id. See Carparts Distr. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England,
826 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.H. 1993), vacated and remanded, No. 93-1954, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28319 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 1994); Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v.
Donaghey, No. 93 Civ. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 1993). In Mason Tenders the court de-
nied the Mason Tenders' motion for summary judgment. Mason Tenders v. Donaghey, No.
93 Civ. 1154, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1993). See also Estate of
Kadinger v. IBEW Local 110, No. Civ 3-93-159, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18982 (D. Minn.
Dec. 21, 1993).
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II. THE ADA's SCOPE OF COVERAGE: IS A SELF-INSURED HEALTH
PLAN A COVERED ENTITY?
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 provides that
"[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to...
employee compensation ... and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment."77 Regulations implemented to enforce this provision ex-
plain that a covered entity may not discriminate against a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability in regard to "[f]ringe benefits available by virtue
of employment, whether or not administered by the covered entity."7
First, the term "covered disability" must be understood. Thereafter,
the language of the ADA raises two additional issues: first, it must be
determined whether AIDS is a disability within the purpose of the Act;
second, it must be determined whether self-insured health benefit funds
are a "covered entity" subject to both the nondiscrimination require-
ments of the ADA and the generally accepted risk classification princi-
ples espoused by the EEOC.
A. AIDS As a Covered Disability Under the ADA
In evaluating whether an individual is within a class protected by the
ADA, it must first be determined whether the individual has a disabil-
ity.79 The term disability under Title I is defined as: "(i) [a] physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; or (ii) a record of having such an impairment
or (iii) being regarded as having such an impairment."830 A person alleg-
ing discrimination on the basis of a disability in violation of any ADA
provision or regulation can enforce his or her rights under the Act."1
Because Congress did not list all of the conditions and impairments
that could form the basis of a disability in the statute, 2 it is appropriate
to examine the legislative history, regulations, and statutory definitions
77. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(f) (1993).
79. INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at 3-4. The charging party
must identify and present a statement that alleges discrimination on the basis of disability.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12.
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)-(3).
81. Id. § 12117(a). Title I also provides that the powers, remedies and procedures of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1991), shall apply to enforce claims
under Title I of the ADA. Id.
82. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 20, at 50, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
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provided under the ADA to determine whether AIDS or HIV ought to
be a covered disability. The legislative history of the ADA reveals that
Congress provided at least a partial list of conditions and diseases in-
tended to be covered by the ADA.8" HIV infection was among the list of
conditions, diseases, and infections specifically mentioned by Congress.84
However, because the ADA statutory definition establishes that impair-
ment "must substantially limit one or more major life activities,"85 a ques-
tion arises whether asymptomatic HIV status qualifies as an
impairment." Further, the EEOC Interim Enforcement Guidance pro-
vides that a disability-based distinction in a health insurance plan, a dis-
tinction that "singles out a particular disability ([such as], deafness,
AIDS, [or] schizophrenia)," is a violation of the ADA. 7 In light of the
83. Id.
84. Id. In contrast, Title V of ADA provides a list of conditions expressly excluded
from the term impairment, including homosexuality, bisexuality, transsexualism, transves-
tism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, compulsive gambling, kleptomania and others.
42 U.S.C. § 12211; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(d), (e). See also Yvette Ostolaza, Note, Severino v.
North Fort Myers Fire Control District; AIDS Discrimination in the Workplace -Will Disclo-
sure Leave H1V-Infected Workers Jobless?, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 241 (1992). The ADA
was modeled after section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1991),
and Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One purpose of section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act was to promote handicapped employment by prohibiting discrimination against
handicapped persons. Because courts have consistently held that HIV infection is a handi-
cap under section 504, HIV is also a disability under the ADA. Id. at 246-49.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) ("No definition of the phrase 'substantially limited' is in-
cluded in the statutory language of the [ADA])." See OGLETREE ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-
19. However, it is indicated that the level of impairment is to be measured by comparison
with the average typical person. Id. The definition of "major life activities" includes, car-
ing for oneself, performing manual tasks, Walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, working, standing, lifting and reaching. Id. at 3-18 and 3-19. This list of major life
activities is not exhaustive. Id.
86. However, procreation and intimate sexual relations were considered "major life
activities" for the purpose of the ADA. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 20, at 52, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 334. Because HIV limits those activities substantially, even
asymptomatic HIV status can qualify as a covered impairment. See Chalk v. District
Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating asymptomatic HIV is a handicap under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act); see also supra note 84 (discussing that the ADA is modeled
on the Rehabilitation Act).
87. INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at 7-8. However, if the provi-
sions based on disability are not a "subterfuge" to evade the purposes of the ADA, the
provisions do not violate the ADA. Id. The INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE provides
the following example:
R Company's new self-insured health insurance plan caps benefits for the treat-
ment of all physical conditions, except AIDS, at $100,000 per year. The treatment
of AIDS is capped at $5,000 per year. CP, an employee with AIDS enrolled in the
health insurance plan, files a charge alleging that the lower AIDS cap violates the
ADA. The lower AIDS cap is a disability based distinction. Accordingly if R is
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legislative history, regulations, and Interpretive Guidance, one may con-
clude that HIV and AIDS are covered disabilities for the purposes of the
ADA.
B. Are Self-Insured Health Funds "Covered Entities" for the Purpose
of the ADA?
The conclusion that AIDS is a covered disability bears significance for
self-insured health funds, but only if self-insured health funds are them-
selves considered "covered entities" under the ADA. If a self-insured
health fund is not a covered entity, then federal district courts will lack
jurisdiction to adjudicate ADA claims filed against them.8
The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual with a disability."8 9 The Act defines a "covered
entity" as "an employer, employment agency, labor organization or a
joint labor-management committee."9 ° Although these terms are not de-
fined in the ADA itself, the terms' definitions were taken from section
701 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,91 and incorporated by
reference into the ADA through EEOC regulations.92
Under the Act, an employer is defined as "a person engaged in an in-
dustry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person."" For purposes
of this analysis, it is beneficial to distinguish self-insured health plans
maintained by a single employer94 from health plans maintained as self-
insured, multiple-employer, or multi-employer, Taft-Hartley trusts.95
unable to demonstrate that its health insurance plan is bona fide and that the
AIDS cap is not a subterfuge, a violation of the ADA will be found.
Id. at 8.
88. See generally Carparts Dist. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New Eng-
land, 826 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.H. 1993), vacated and remanded, No. 93-1954, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28319 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 1994). The district court dismissed the ADA suit against
the self-insured health fund because the court determined the fund was not a covered en-
tity. Id. at 587.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
90. Id. § 12111(2).
91. Id. § 2000(e).
92. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.2.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). The term employer includes the states but expressly excludes
the United States government and its wholly owned subsidiaries, Indian tribes, and bona
fide private membership clubs. Id. § 12111(5)(b).
94. A "single-employer plan" is defined under ERISA section 3(41) as "an employee
benefit plan other than a multi-employer plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(41).
95. Id. § 1002(37). See also infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
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A multi-employer health plan is a plan to which more than one em-
ployer contributes and is maintained pursuant to one or more collective
bargaining agreements. 96 The Taft-Hartley Act 97 mandates that employ-
ees and employers must be represented equally on the board of trustees
that administer such a fund. 98 The employer and employee representa-
tives together are trustees of the fund. Each trust fund has its own legal
identity. 99 Thus, even though the trustees of the plan are appointed by a
labor union or an employer, they do not represent the interests of the
appointing party."° Rather, the trustees must administer the trust for the
"sole and exclusive benefit" of the beneficiaries of the trust.' 0 '
A single-employer plan is defined as a plan other than a multi-em-
ployer plan.'" The employer is the plan sponsor.'03 Because the em-
ployer is the plan sponsor and directly determines the content and
provisions of the plan, a single-employer, self-insured plan is under the
direct control of the employer. Thus, when a single employer maintains a
self-insured plan, the plan Would most likely be considered an "em-
ployer," or at least the agent of the sponsoring employer, within the
terms of the ADA.
However, the question of whether a self-insured, multi-employer
health fund is a "covered entity" for the purposes of the ADA is not as
clear. Because the multi-employer, self-insured fund is governed by the
Taft-Hartley Act, it is administered by a board of independent trustees
appointed by the employer and labor organization and prohibited from
representing the interests of their appointing parties.'" Thus, the Taft-
Hartley trust is an independent entity under the law. Even though an
96. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37). See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29
U.S.C. § 186(c) (1988 & Supp. 1990). It is estimated that there are over 2,500 multi-em-
ployer welfare benefit plans that cover an estimated 8.5 million active participants. JOHN
H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 48-49 (1990).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 186.
98. Id. § 186(c)(5).
99. ERISA section 502(d)(1) provides that "an employee benefit plan may sue or be
sued as an entity." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1). Service of process made upon a trustee or
administrator constitutes service of process on the plan. Id. See Laborers Health and Wel-
fare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete, 484 U.S. 539 (1988) (allowing health
benefit fund to sue in its own legal capacity).
100. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 334 (1981) (holding that "an employee
benefit fund trustee is a fiduciary whose duty to the trust beneficiaries must overcome any
loyalty to the interest of the party that appointed him").
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 186(c).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(41).
103. Id. § 1002(15)(B)(i).
104. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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employer makes contributions to the Taft-Hartley trust pursuant to a
written agreement, 105 the fund is not actually the employer of the
participant.' 6
It may be argued that the trustees of the Taft-Hartley fund, who were
appointed either by the union or the employer, are agents of the em-
ployer. Such a contention must survive the scrutiny of NLRB v. Amax
Coal Co.' °7 Amax made clear that the duty of the appointed trustee of
an employee benefit plan, established under Taft-Hartley section
302(c)(5) (a multi-employer plan) "is directly antithetical to that of an
agent of the appointing party."'0° Thus, it will likely be held that for the
purposes of the ADA the trustees will also not be deemed agents of the
appointing party.
In Carparts Distribution Center v. Automotive Wholesalers Association
of New England, °9 the United States District Court of New Hampshire
determined that a self-insured health plan does not qualify as a coveted
entity under the ADA." ° Significantly, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit recently vacated and remanded the district
court decision for reconsideration."' In Carparts, the plaintiff was the
owner and sole shareholder of an automobile parts distributor. 1 2 The
plaintiff's company participated in a health benefit plan sponsored by the
Automotive Wholesalers Association of New England, Inc. (AWANE). 13
The plan was self-funded and uninsured." 4 After the plaintiff was diag-
nosed HIV positive, AWANE and the AWANE health benefit plan
105. For an employer to make contributions to a qualified health plan, the terms of the
plan are required to be in writing. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).
106. ERISA section 3(5) defines the term "employer" as "any person acting directly as
an employer, or indirectly in the interest of the employer." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). A self-
insured health plan does not directly employ its participants, nor can the trustees represent
the employer's interests. See NLRB v. Amax Coal, 453 U.S. 322 (1981).
107. 453 U.S. 322 (1981).
108. Id. at 331-32.
109. 826 F. 8upp. 583 (D.N.H. 1993), vacated and remanded, No. 93-1954, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 28319 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 1994).
110. Id. at 585. In response to plaintiffs' allegation that AWANE and the AWANE plan
were "covered entities," the court stated that "[n]either AWANE nor the AWANE PLAN
qualify as a covered entity as that term is defined in the [ADA] as neither was an employer
of [the plaintiff]." Id.
111. Carparts Dist. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, No. 93-
1954, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 28319, at *27 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 1994).
112. Carparts, 826 F. Supp. at 585.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 584.
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capped lifetime benefits for AIDS-related illnesses at $25,000."' A maxi-
mum of one millon dollars in benefits would continue to be provided for
other than AIDS-related illnesses.' 6 The plaintiff filed suit under the
ADA alleging discrimination based on the terms of the health insurance
coverage modification." 7 The district court found that the trust was not a
"covered entity" because it was not the employer of the plaintiff." 8 Be-
cause Carparts Distribution Center (Carparts) was wholly owned by the
plaintiff, the sole shareholder, Carparts was not named as a defendant." 9
Therefore, the district court never addressed whether the trust was an
agent of Carparts.120 Accordingly, the district court dismissed the action
in favor of defendant on a motion for summary judgment.12' The First
Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of
whether the health benefit plan was the "employer" of the plaintiff.' 22
However, before considering whether the health benefit plan may be
deemed an "employer," it is appropriate to consider other possibilities
under which the health benefit plan may be deemed a covered entity.
Although the plaintiff failed to assert that the AWANE plan fit within
any of the other definitions of a "covered entity" under the ADA, such as
an employment agency, joint labor-management committee, or labor or-
ganization, it is unlikely that plaintiff would have prevailed. First, the
AWANE fund is not or would not be deemed an "employment agency" as
defined by section 701(c) of Title VII.' 23 Employment agency is defined
as "any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to
procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportu-
nities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person.' '124
Because it is not the function of the AWANE fund, or the function of any
115. Id. at 585. Plaintiff was diagnosed HIV positive on May 12, 1986. After the diagno-





119. See generally id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 588.
122. Carparts Dist. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, No. 93-
1954, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 28319, at *13-14, *27 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 1994). See infra notes
143-170 (considering theories under which the health plan could be considered an
"employer").
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The terms person, labor organization, and employment
agency have the same meaning given to the terms as in section 701 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Id. § 12111(7).
124. Id. § 2000e(c).
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health plan, to procure employment for its participants, the AWANE plan
would not be deemed an employment agency.
A "joint labor-management committee" is defined as a committee
"controlling apprenticeship or other training programs, including an on-
the-job retraining program, or Federal entity subject to section [717]. "125
Because the AWANE health plan did not engage or control an appren-
ticeship or job training program, the fund is not a joint labor-manage-
ment committee.
Arguably, the definition of "labor union" could be deemed to include a
Taft-Hartley fund. A labor organization is defined in section 701(d) as:
[A] labor organization engaged in any industry affecting com-
merce, and any agent of such an organization, and includes any
organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representa-
tion committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, la-
bor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or condi-
tions of employment, and any conference, general committee,
joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is
subordinate to a national or international labor organization.
126
The definition of labor organization found in section 701(d) establishes
that an entity must have as its purpose "in whole or in part" the object of
"dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay" and the other subjects of collective bargaining in order to
constitute a labor union.127 In Amax the Supreme Court found that fund
trustees "are not representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining
or the adjustment of grievances."'" Because it is clear that a trust and its
trustees are not permitted in their role as trustees to be representatives
for the purposes of collective bargaining, 129 it is arguable that a trust fund
cannot be a labor organization. If correct, this conclusion would remove
the last possible basis on which a district court could assert jurisdiction
directly over a self-insured, multi-employer health fund.
However, neither Carparts nor any other case to date has addressed
whether the AWANE plan or other self-insured, multi or multiple em-
ployer trust could be considered a labor-organization and thus a "covered
125. Id. § 2000e(n).
126. Id. § 2000e(d).
127. See id.
128. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 334 (1981).
129. See supra notes 100, 101, 108 and accompanying text.
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entity" for the purposes of ADA. Because millions of Americans are in-
sured by self-funded health plans, 30 the outcome of the litigation consid-
ering whether the ADA risk classification principles apply to these funds
is an important issue with vast implications for health insurers and those
who are insured.
Since Carparts, further litigation has focused on whether a self-insured
trust will be considered a covered entity. Currently before the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York is Mason
Tenders District Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey.'3' In Mason Ten-
ders, Terrence Donaghey was a participant in the Mason Tenders District
Council Trust Fund, a jointly managed, self-insured, labor-management
health trust fund.132 After Donaghey was diagnosed with HIV, the Ma-
son Tenders' health trust fund modified its health coverage and discontin-
ued all coverage for any health expenses incurred for any treatment
related to any infections or diseases related to HIV, AIDS, or AIDS-
related complex (ARC).' 3 3 Although Donaghey continued to participate
in the plan, after July 1, 1991, he was not reimbursed for medical ex-
penses related to HIV or AIDS because of the plan's complete exclusion
of treatment related to HIV."' Donaghey filed charges with the regional
office of the EEOC asserting that the Mason Tenders' health plan vio-
lated the ADA because it excluded coverage related to HIV, a covered
disability. 35 The EEOC determined that the Mason Tenders' health
trust fund exclusion facially violated the ADA. 36 The current EEOC
position is that a self-insured benefit fund is a covered entity within the
meaning of the ADA. 1 37 The determination of whether the Mason Ten-
ders' health fund is a covered entity, however, will ultimately be for the
courts to determine.
Under what legal principles might the Mason Tenders' health trust
fund be considered a "labor organization" in light of the holding in Amax
and ERISA's fiduciary requirements? 38 The recent decision in Mor-
130. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
131. No. 93 Civ. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 1993).
132. See Determination Letter, supra note 75, at 1-2.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1-2.
135. Id.
136. Id. "The [EEOC's] ... investigation finds Respondent's medical insurance prac-
tices appears, on its face, to violate the American with Disabilities Act of 1990." Id. at 2.
137. Id.; Determination Letter, supra note 75, at 1-2; INTERIM ENFORCEMENT Gui-
DANCE, supra note 10, at 7-9.
138. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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ganbesser v. United States139 sheds some light on one possibility. In Mor-
ganbesser, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a local union's pension plan was a labor organization, at least
for tax purposes." 4 The court found that the plan was a labor organiza-
tion because it was established pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment and a multi-employer plan, administered by a board of trustees
comprised equally of employer and union representatives.1 4' The opin-
ion stated that the district court "properly held that the trust meets the
requirements of a labor organization and qualifies for an exemption
under § 501(c)(5) of the [Internal Revenue] Code."' 42
Significantly, the same court in 1982 interpreted the term "employer"
broadly enough to include any party significantly affecting any person's
access to employment opportunities. 43 In Spirt v. Teachers Insurance &
Annuity Association,'" the Second Circuit found insurance companies,
which were not the employer of those insured, liable under Title VII for
benefit plan distinctions based on discriminatory sex-segregated mortality
tables.145 In Spirt, an insurance company that was not directly the em-
ployer of the plaintiff was held to be an "employer" under Title VII be-
cause the term is "sufficiently broad to encompass any party who
significantly affects access of any individual to employment opportunities,
regardless of whether that party may technically be described as an 'em-
ployer' of an aggrieved individual.' 146 Thus, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that a third party insurance com-
pany "which exist[s] solely for the purpose of enabling universities to
delegate their responsibility to provide retirement benefits for their em-
ployees, [is] so closely intertwined with those universities .. .that [it]
must be deemed an 'employer' for the purposes of Title VII.,' 47 In fact,
the recent United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decision in
Carparts explicitly remanded the case for reconsideration of whether the
139. 984 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1993).
140. Id. at 564 (stating that it is "allowed [for] entities which carry out the function of a
labor organization to be jointly administered by employers and employees and still qualify




144. 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982).
145. Id. at 1054.
146. Id. at 1063 (quoting Vanguard Justice Soc'y, Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 696
(D. Md. 1979)).
147. Id.
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AWANE health benefit plan functioned as an employer. 148 The First Cir-
cuit, relying on Spirt, stated that if "the AWANE and AWANE Plan exist
solely for the purpose of enabling entities such as Carparts to delegate
their responsibility to provide health insurance for their employees, they
are so intertwined with those entities that they must be deemed an 'em-
ployer' for the purposes of Title I of the ADA.
149
Given the logic of Morganbesser and Spirt and the First Circuit's opin-
ion in Carparts, it is possible that the" Mason Tenders' health benefit fund
could be deemed either a "labor organization" under Morganbesser,150 or
alternatively, an "employer" under the theory that the fund, Donaghey's
union, and the employer are so closely intertwined that the health trust
fund must be deemed an employer for the purposes of the ADA. 15 1 It
follows then that just as the insurance company was a third-party institu-
tion managing and setting the terms of an employee benefit, so too is the
Mason Tenders' health trust fund a third-party entity responsible for em-
ployee benefits of a discrete participant pool. As the court in Spirt
pointed out, "the language of the Supreme Court... would seem to com-
pel a finding that delegation of responsibility for employee benefits can-
not insulate a discriminatory plan from attack.' 152 The opinion also
stated that an employer could not avoid his responsibilities by delegating
discriminatory programs to corporate shells.' 53
Of course, it is possible to distinguish Morganbesser and Spirt from the
Mason Tenders scenario on several grounds. First, both Morganbesser
and Spirt considered pension benefits, whereas Mason Tenders is con-
cerned with health benefits. 154 However, because we are here concerned
with the status of each entity as a trust, this distinction is not necessarily
dispositive when considering that the pension and health funds are tax
qualified and jointly administered by a board of trustees. However, it
must be noted that Morganbesser was a tax case.' 55 It certainly is possi-
ble, therefore, that a court might find a health trust fund to be a labor
148. Carparts Dist. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, No. 93-
1954, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 28319, at *13-14, *27 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 1994).
149. Id. at *12.
150. See Morganbesser v. United States, 984 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1982).
151. See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Morganbesser, 984 F.2d at 561-63 (discussing pension plan benefits); Spirt, 691
F.2d at 1062-64 (considering annuity retirement contracts); Mason Tenders District Council
Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, No. 93 Civ. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. filed 1993) (considering payment of
health benefits); see generally Determination Letter, supra note 75.
155. Morganbesser v. United States, 984 F.2d 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1992).
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organization for tax purposes, and yet not a labor organization within the
definition of the ADA.'56 Spirt is potentially distinguished because it was
a Title VII action.' 57 Whereas the definition of "employer" for Title VII
purposes was intended to be interpreted broadly,'58 it could be argued
that the definition under the ADA was intended to be interpreted nar-
rowly. However, because the ADA regulations incorporate the Title VII
definition of employer, this proposition is unlikely. 159 It is important to
note that the reasoning of Spirt is not accepted by all of the Circuit
Courts. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit concluded that a third-party insurer could be deemed an em-
ployer,"6 the Sixth Circuit has taken the opposite position, concluding
that a third-party insurer has no liability under Title VII.16
1
Moreover, even if it is determined that the benefit fund is not a cov-
ered entity, Donaghey, the Mason Tenders plaintiff, and the EEOC may
still be able to sustain their discrimination suit against Donaghey's local
union and his employer. They could argue that an "employer" and a "la-
bor organization," both covered entities for the purpose of the ADA, 62
are prohibited from "participating in a contract or other arrangement or
relationship that has the effect of subjecting the covered entity's qualified
applicant or employee with a disability to discrimination.' '163 Further,
they could point to the EEOC regulations that specifically declare that
"[it is unlawful for a covered entity to participate in a contractual or
other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting the
covered entity's own qualified applicant or employee with a disability to
156. In Morganbesser, the court considered whether the trust fund would lose its tax
exempt status. Id. Had the court found that the fund was not a "labor organization" the
fund would have lost its tax exempt status and would have been liable for significant tax
penalties. Id. at 566. The court never discussed whether the trust performed any of the
traditional functions of a labor organization, such as dealing with employees concerning
grievances, labor disputes or wages.
157. Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054 1056, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982).
158. Id. at 1063.
159. See 42 C.F.R. § 1601.2.
160. Spin, 691 F.2d at 1063.
161. Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that an em-
ployer did not retain an insurance company as agents and as such the insurance companies
were not liable under Title VII for providing an employer with a benefit program based on
a sex-segregated mortality table), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223
(1983).
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5); see supra notes 95, 125, 126 and accompanying text.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2). Such contractual agreements include a relationship with
"an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity. " Id.
Do AIDS Caps Violate the Law?
the discrimination prohibited.""' An organization that provides fringe
benefits to an employee of a covered entity is specifically mentioned as
one of the types of contractual relationships that is prohibited from dis-
criminating.' 65 The purpose of this provision is to prevent a covered en-
tity from doing indirectly what the entity could not achieve directly.
In Mason Tenders, both the labor union, which served as Donaghey's
agent for collective bargaining, and the health trust fund were named par-
ties.' 66 Because the employer associations and the labor union entered
into collective bargaining agreements with a fund that is allegedly dis-
criminating against a covered disability, HIV, the employer and labor
union, as covered entities, arguably are violating the ADA because they
have entered into a contractual arrangement that subjects a person with a
qualified disability to discriminatory practices.' 67 Accordingly, the labor
union and the employer may be found to be liable under the ADA for
doing indirectly what they would be prohibited from doing directly.168
Interestingly, the district court in Carparts pointed out that liability
under the ADA for the alleged discrimination against plaintiff would lie
with Carparts, the employer, because Carparts subjected plaintiff to the
alleged discriminatory practices of the AWANE health fund. 1 69 Before
concluding that the covered entities are discriminating against a covered
disability, such as AIDS, we must first venture through the complex and
sometimes confusing maze of section 501(c) of the ADA. 170
III. SECTION 501(c); TEMPERING THE BROAD NONDISCRIMINATION
PROVISION
It is unlawful for a covered entity to discriminate on the basis of disa-
bility in regard to the terms and conditions of employment.' 7 ' Moreover,
EEOC regulations provide that it is unlawful for a covered entity to dis-
164. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6(a).
165. Id. § 1630.4(f).
166. See ANSWER OF DEFENDANT DONAGHEY TO AMENDED COMPLAINT, AFFIRMA-
TIVE DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIMS at 24, No. 93 Civ. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 1993).
167. The health benefit fund excluded all coverage for illnesses related to HIV or
AIDS. Id. at 23. See Determination Letter, supra note 75, at 1.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
169. See Carparts Dist. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, 826 F.
Supp. 583, 585 (D.N.H. 1993), vacated and remanded, No. 93-1954, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
28319 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 1994).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). The text of 501(c) is paraphrased in section 1630.16(f) of the
EEOC regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(f).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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criminate on the basis of disability against a qualified individual with a
disability with respect to fringe benefits available by virtue of employ-
ment, whether or not administered by the covered entity.172 If this broad
prohibition were read literally and out of context, one would have to con-
clude that under no circumstances could a covered entity provide or con-
tract with a health fund that provided disparate treatment for any
covered disability under the ADA. The impact of such a broad prohibi-
tion could prove devastating to the financial integrity of the health insur-
ance industry.173
Congress added section 501(c) of the ADA to alleviate the concerns of
the broad anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA and to temper the
effect of the anti-discrimination provisions with respect to health insur-
ance. 174 Section 501(c) generally provides that health insurance provid-
ers may continue to rely on traditional risk classification and risk
underwriting principles in administering health plans. 175 Specifically, sec-
tion 501(c) describes the relationship of the ADA to employee benefit
plans:
(c) Insurance.-Subchapters I through II of this Chapter and Ti-
tle IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict -
(1) an insurer, hospital, or medical service company, health
maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that ad-
ministers benefit plans, or similar organizations from un-
derwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such
risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the
terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on under-
172. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(f).
173. One fear of employers is that the EEOC "will severely restrict customary insur-
ance practices aimed at cost containment [and) [e]mployers and insurers will swiftly be
ushered to the steps of the bankruptcy court." Thomasina Rogers et al., ADA and Benefits
Plans: A Civil Rights Law Perspective, 5 BENEurrs L.J. 377, 377 (1992).
174. S. REP. No. 116., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86 (1989).
In sum, section 501(c) is intended to afford to insurers and employers the same
opportunities they would enjoy in the absence of this legislation to design and
administer insurance products and benefits plans in a manner that is consistent
with basic principles of insurance risk classification. Without such a clarification,
this legislation could arguably find violative of its provisions any action taken by
an insurer or employer which treats disabled persons differently under an insur-
ance or benefit plan because they represent an increased hazard of death or
illness.
Id.
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
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writing risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the
terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State
laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter.176
By implementing section 501(c), the ADA leaves intact the risk and
underwriting classifications that were available prior to its passage. 77
Thus, "Congress acted in Title V of the ADA expressly to hold harmless
insurance practices borne of risk classification and underwriting in the
case of employer-purchased insurance."' 178 Commentators have noted
that even by including broad prohibitions against discrimination on the
basis of disability, many traditional insurance practices will escape the
regulation of the ADA because of the Title V exemption. 179 These risk
classification principles comprise a traditional insurance practice that in-
surers have relied upon to manage the cost of their health care plans. 180
Section 501(c)(1) and (2) of the ADA permit the use of underwriting and
classifying risks. 181
A. Traditional Risk Classification
Risk classification is a system of "grouping risks with similar character-
istics for the purpose of setting [insurance] prices."' 82 Health insurers use
risk classification principles to determine the cost of a benefit or a plan of
benefits. 83 Insurers and employers can use insurance claim and cost in-
formation to asses risk and in turn use this information in managing their
health plans and their costs. 1"4 A result of using risk classification princi-
ples is to limit, restrict, or .exclude coverage for certain procedures or
illnesses. 85 Arguably, because the ADA allows risk classification, an in-
surer could exclude coverage even for a covered disability if the insurer
176. Id. § 12201(c).
177. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 174, at 85-86.
178. Rogers et al., supra note 173, at 378.
179. Id.
180. See infra notes 182-186 and accompanying text.
181. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201(c)(1), (2).
182. Harry L. Drake, The ADA and Risk Classification in Benefits Plans, 5 BENEFITS
L.J. 393, 396 (1992).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 394
185. Id.
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followed accepted risk classification principles in reaching its determina-
tion. 86 However, if an insurer does not need to use risk classification
principles, the insurer could arguably exclude or cap an illness without
having to justify the exclusion or cap.
B. Self-Insured Funds and Section 501(c)
In light of the ambiguous language of section 501(c), and, in particular,
501(c)(3)'s ambiguity, it is uncertain whether self-insured health funds
are required to justify a limitation or exclusion for a covered disability by
utilizing risk classification principles. Sections 501(c)(1) and (2) explicitly
state that a covered entity must underwrite or classify risks "that are
based on or not inconsistent with State law."' 8 7 In section 501(c)(3) there
is no reference to risk underwriting or classification.188 Also, whereas
501(c)(1) and (2) invoke state law principles of underwriting and risk
classification into their schemes and texts, 501(c)(3) explicitly permits ob-
serving and administering "a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to
State laws that regulate insurance.' '189
The language implies that section 501(c)(2) refers to "insured" health
plans that purchase insurance contracts as these plans are subject to state
insurance laws and the risk classification policies of the state. Section
501(c)(3), by referring to benefit plans not subject to state laws, impli-
cates self-insured plans. This implication is a result of the fact that ERISA
preemption has traditionally taken self-insured funds out from under the
statutory jurisdiction of state insurance law."9 Therefore, self-insured
plans arguably are not required to justify disability-based distinctions on
accepted risk classification principles because of the traditional exemp-
tion of self-insured plans from state law and the absence of language in
section 501(c)(3) referring to risk classification principles. Consequently,
the argument is advanced that when a self-insured fund desires to cap or
exclude health insurance for a covered disability, the self-insured fund
does not need to apply risk classification principles because section
186. See generally INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10. The EEOC notes
that a covered entity charged with discriminating in health care benefits because of "disa-
bility based disparate treatment that is not justified by the risks and costs associated with
the disability" may prove that the terms of the plan are not in fact discriminating. Id. at 11-
13.
187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201(c)(1), (2).
188. Id. § 12201(c)(3).
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
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501(c)(3) did not intend to import these practices to self-insured funds.' 91
Instead, the regulation of the funds would simply be governed by ERISA
and the body of law that was in place prior to the ADA. The law prior to
the ADA was set forth in McGann v. H & H Music Co., 92 which pro-
vided that a self-insured health plan had broad authority to modify, ex-
clude or terminate benefits. 193
An analysis of section 501(c) does not end with a facial investigation of
its text. The ADA legislative history reveals that:
[Slection 501(c)(3) has been added to address one particular
concern. There was some concern raised on the part of those
who administer self-insurance plans that the language of section
501(c)(2) could be read to affect the preemption doctrine of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Congress
does not intend in this bill to affect in any way such preemption
doctrine ....194
The Senate Labor Committee explained its understanding of section
501(c):
Since there is some uncertainty over the possible interpretations
of the language contained in [ADA] Titles I, II and III as it ap-
plies to insurance, the Committee added section 501(c) to make
it clear that this legislation will not disrupt the current nature of
insurance underwriting or the current regulatory structure for
self-insured employers or of the insurance industry in sales, un-
derwriting, pricing, administrative and other services, claims,
and similar insurance related activities based on classification of
risks as regulated by the: States.195
Reading the Senate Labor Committee Report in conjunction with Sena-
tor Harkin's statement implies that Congress intended that self-insured
plans would continue to be exempt from state insurance law under the
ADA. The Senate Labor Committee Report also may be read to pre-
serve the pre-ADA regulatory structure for self-insured health plans.
However, the Senate Labor Report goes on to state that "the [ADA] is
intended to apply nondiscrimination standards equally to self-insured
plans as well as to third-party payer.., plans with respect to persons with
191. The argument that the risk classification principles espoused in sections 501(c)(1)
and (2) should apply to section 501(c)(3) must overcome the structural framework of
501(c) which implies that each subsection is to be read discretely.
192. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
193. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
194. 135 CONG. REC. 19,876 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
195. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 174, at 84 (emphasis added).
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disabilities.' 196
Despite the fact that risk classification principles are absent in section
501(c)(3), the EEOC has taken the position that limitations and exclu-
sions of coverage in self-insured plans must be justified by risk classifica-
tion principles. 97 The EEOC's Determination Letter in Mason Tenders
states:
The Commission's investigation reveals Respondent [The Ma-
son Tenders Health Plan] did not follow any accepted risk classi-
fication for excluding HIV/AIDS coverage from its health
insurance plan .... Respondent also admits it had no actuarial
study recommending exclusion of HIV/AIDS coverage or that it
would be in financial difficulty if it continued the coverage.
Significantly, Respondent admits it continues to pay benefits for
other high cost medical conditions such as cancer, heart disease,
and kidney disease. Moreover, the Commission's investigation
and evidence of record reveals no actuarial justification for ex-
clusion of HIV/AIDS coverage.
Based on Respondent's admissions, the Commission finds in this
particular case, there is no valid rationale to the exclusion of
HIV/AIDS coverage .... Respondent has violated the ADA. 19 8
Although states have adopted risk classification principles, self-insured
funds are not within the province of state law.' 99 Thus, the EEOC's posi-
tion that risk classification principles must be applied to all insurance
plans, whether self-insured or not,2° ° may create uncertainty as to what
risk classification principles should be applied to self-insured funds. The
EEOC could alleviate this uncertainty by drawing risk classification prin-
ciples from state law,201 by adopting model insurance regulations, or by
promulgating risk classification principles through regulation.
196. Id. at 86.
197. See INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at 6-12.
198. See Spencer H. Lewis, District Director, EEOC, Determination, Donaghey v. Ma-
son Tenders Dist. Council Rust Fund, No. 160-93-1101 (Apr. 1993) [hereinafter Determi-
nation Letter II].
199. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
200. See generally INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10. See also Deter-
mination Letter II, supra note 198, at 1-3.
201. For example, the EEOC could adopt the risk classification principles of the state of
the district court that is hearing the action. However, this may create a lack of uniformity
in the application of risk classification. For the sake of uniformity the EEOC may wish to
promulgate risk classification principles through regulation.
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In response to the uncertainty about the scope of health insurance the
EEOC, on June 8, 1993, issued Interim Enforcement Guidance regula-
tions which consider the applicability of the ADA to disability-based dis-
tinctions in employer-provided health insurance plans. 2" The regulations
provide that whenever an individual charges a term or provision con-
tained in an employee health benefit plan violates the ADA, the first
question that must be answered is whether the term or provision is in fact
a disability-based distinction.2 °3 The regulations explain the term disabil-
ity-based distinction by explaining what is not a disability-based distinc-
tion. "Insurance distinctions that are not based on disability, and that are
applied equally to all insured employees, do not discriminate on the basis
of disability and so do not violate the ADA."2" Therefore, benefit plans
that provide a lower level of benefits for mental and nervous conditions
than for other medical conditions are not disability based distinctions." 5
Similarly, blanket pre-existing condition clauses are not disability based
distinctions.2" However, health-related insurance distinctions that are
based on a disability may violate the ADA.2 °7 For example, a term or
provision in a health plan is disability based if it singles out a particular
disability, such as, deafness, AIDS, and schizophrenia,"' or a term is dis-
ability based if a discrete group of disabilities, such as cancer, muscular
dystrophy, or kidney disease, is singled out.20 9
Yet even if the term or provision in a self-insured benefit plan is a disa-
bility based distinction, the plan may avoid liability under the ADA if two
conditions are met. First, the plan must be proven to be a "bona fide"
employee benefit plan.210 For self-insured funds this requirement is satis-
fied by proof that it exists as a plan, pays benefits, and accurately com-
municates the terms of the plan to covered participants.21'
Once it is shown that the plan is "bona fide," it must prove that the
"disability-based distinction" is not a subterfuge designed to avoid the
purposes of the ADA.212 The EEOC Interim Enforcement Guidance de-
202. See INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 10, at 1.
203. Id. at 3-4.
204. Id. at 5.
205. Id. at 1.
206. Id. at 7.
207. See id. at 6-10.
208. Id. at 7.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 10-11.
211. Id. at 11.
212. Id. The term "subterfuge" is not defined in the ADA.
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fines subterfuge as a "disability based disparate treatment that is not jus-
tified by the risks or costs associated with the disability."21 The
regulations provide five justifications to explain how it can be proven that
a plan is not a subterfuge to avoid the purposes of the ADA:
a. The respondent may prove that it has not engaged in the disa-
bility-based disparate treatment alleged.
b. The respondent may prove that the disparate treatment is jus-
tified by legitimate actuarial data, or by actual or reasonably an-
ticipated experience ....
c. The respondent may prove that the disparate treatment is nec-
essary (i.e. that there is no disability-based health insurance plan
change that could be made) to ensure that the challenged health
insurance plan satisfies the commonly accepted or legally re-
quired standards for the fiscal soundness of such an insurance
plan.
d. The respondent may prove that the challenged insurance
practice or activity is necessary (i.e. that there is no disability
based change that could be made) to prevent the occurrence of
an unacceptable change either in the coverage of the health in-
surance plan, or in the premiums charged for the health insur-
ance plan.
e. Where the charging party is challenging the respondent's de-
nial of coverage for a disability-specific treatment, the respon-
dent may prove that this treatment does not provide any benefit
214
Thus the EEOC's position is that in order to exclude or cap a covered
disability, a health plan must justify the exclusion based on risk classifica-
tion. However, it is uncertain whether or not the courts will sustain such
a position in light of section 501(c), which does not include specific lan-
guage requiring risk classification. It could be argued that Congress
chose not to include within section 501(c)(3) language mandating the use
213. Id. Interestingly, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) has a
"subterfuge proviso" that is worded analogously to the ADA's proviso. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(0(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also Kimberly A. Ackourey, Comment, Insuring
Americans with Disabilities: How Far Can Congress Go To Protect Traditional Practices?,
40 EMORY L.J. 1183 (1991) (comparing the ADA with the ADEA subterfuge proviso and
concluding that the ADA will adopt the ADEA's case law interpreting that proviso). How-
ever, courts interpreting the ADEA have defined subterfuge as a "scheme, plan, stratagem
or artifice of evasion." Id. at 1192. The ADA, on the other hand, has declared that for the
purposes of the ADA "subterfuge refers to disability based disparate treatment that is not
justified by the risks or costs associated with the disability." INTERIM ENFORCEMENT Gui.
DANCE, supra note 10, at 11.
214. Id. at 11-13.
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of risk classification, and that the EEOC, through its regulations is trying
to federalize standards of risk management without congressional
authorization.
IV. CONCLUSION
Self-insured health plans likely will be deemed covered entities, 1 5 or at
least federal courts could assert jurisdiction over an employer or labor
organization that contracts with a self-insured health plan.216 However,
even if the self-insured health plan is determined to be a covered entity,
neither the plan itself nor parties contracting with the plan will violate the
ADA if they cap or exclude coverage without relying on risk classification
principles. The EEOC's regulations declaring that self-insured health
plans must comply with risk classification will be deemed invalid because
the EEOC has ventured beyond the statutory mandate of ADA section
501(c).
Patrick J. Morgan
215. See supra Part III.B of this text. The courts likely will adopt the analysis in Spirt v.
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982).
216. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
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